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History of the First
NASA Contract
with Russia

Barbara D. Connelly-Fratzke
NASA Headquarters
Office of Space Systems Development

Th is story begins after the end of the cold war with the Soviet Union. after
perestroika had its initial impact on the economy, at about the time the
Russian space firms were beginning to lose government support and fac ing
hard times ahead.
As part or the FY92 Budget approval, Congress, in its wisdom, directed
NASA to investigate the Russian space hardware and determine its
feasibility for use in the U.S. space program. At the invitation of the U.S.
Embassy in Moscow and the Russian firm NPO Energia, NASA made a
reconnaissance visit to NPO Energia to open d iscussions concern ing Russian
space hardware. The trip was successfu l in that NPO Energia opened their
facility and proudly displayed their space hardware, launch capabilities.
etc. to NASA. NASA left Russia with a heightened understandin g of the
desperate situation Russian space firms found themselves in with wan ing
support from their own governme nt. The firm was desperate enough it
seemed, to peddle their hardware elsewhere if NASA wasn't a viable
customer. It was made crystal clear that the firm could only conti nue.
anything approaching their current seale of operation, with an influx or
hard currency from outside Russia.
The specte r of losing the technology to o ur econom ic competi tors in Europe
and Japan, combined with the possibility that no one wou ld act quickly
e nough and NPO Energia would collapse and its technology be scattered to
the winds, drove NASA to take unprecedented actions to engage NPO
E nerg ia in a year long study of its hardware technology for possible
application to the U.S. space program.
In the past NASA had participated in cooperati ve agreements, suc h as the
Apollo/Soyuz program, where each government supplied its part of the
effort. The idea of actually o ut and o ut purchase or Russian hardware and
technology was so revolutionary that I refer to it as first hand experience
with " Russian Roulette," because nothing was as you expected it to be! It
fit none of the U.S. paradigms for doing business with a foreign en tity.
The Russian firm was attempting to privatize but its onl y customer was
still the Russian government. It continued to function as a Government
Design Bureau but incorporated itself in the State of New York with a U.S.
subsidiary, and establi shed a two person offi ce in Washington. DC. But the
firm had little or no hard currency with which to operate. They didn't
even have sufficient currency for travel to the U.S. to conduct negotiatio ns
and/or discussions with NASA.
It all started for me in April 1993. I was recently hired by NASA away
from DOD and assigned to the Offi ce of Procurement. My experience in
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international contracting with NATO and the F-16 co-production program
caused me, in the opinion of the Associate Administrator, to be uniquely
suited to develop the acquisition strategy for this first Russian
procurement. This was to be NASA' s first attempt to contract with a
Russian firm and necessitated the development of a uniquely tailored
acquisition strategy to contract with the Russians in under 30 days.
What appeared to be an impossible task was made possible by NASA
senior management's commitment of top level resources, access to prior
legal opinions on statutory requirements, and clear direction to simplify
the process as much as possible.
The Russian firm, NPO Energia, could well use $1 million in U.S. currency to
sustain its operations severly impacted by the latest round of upheavals,
coups, and finally a leadership change in Russia. In return, NASA would
have access to a full range of space hardware and technology, from the
Soyuz TM spacecraft, to automated rendezvous and docking systems, test
facilities, launch vehicles, MIR space station modules, and even an
electrical test bed for the Buran orbiter/shuttle.
NPO Energia agreed to support a wide range of special studies and tasking
during the life of what would have been a one year basic contract.
NASA developed a simplified contract structure to accommodate this very
general understanding between a former Communist Design Bureau and
the United States Government. The use of other forms of agreements was
considered but discarded based on legal and procurement advice. The
advice resulted in direction to introduce the Russian firms, attempting to
privatize and desiring to conduct business in the world market, to the
Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) and the standard practices involved
in doing business with the United States Government.
Creation of a simplified acquisition strategy necessitated a bottoms-up
review of generally applied FAR provisions, rules for waiving and
deviating from the standard provisions, and the development of unique
provisions to expressly respond to the unique circumstances of a
Communist firm newly privatized, but having only a single customer, the
Russian government. This analysis led us to conclude that NASA could
waive or deviate almost completely from the FAR. However, a rather more
conservative position was settled on by NASA's Senior Procurement
Executive (SPE). When the decision was made to use the FAR, the
minimum compliment of regulatory provisions that could be applied were
when the U.S. · dealt with a foreign Government. A decision was made to
continue to treat NPO Energia as a Government Bureau.
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The normal provisions, applicable to a foreign government, could then be
applied to the Russian contract. NASA would require Examination of
Records by the Comptroller General and the Anti-kickback Provisions to
reinforce the high standards required in business dealings with the U.S. In
recognition of the Russian's complete lack of accounting practices, a
decision was made to waive Cost and Pricing data and all pertinent cost
provisions as well as all of the environmental and socieo economic
provisions.
The fairness and reasonableness of the price, would be establi shed on the
basis of the lowest price for the same or similar effort in the U.S. This
form of price analysis would establish the lowest price in the U.S. and an
upper limit for the negotiations with the Russians. In the absence of
accounting principles, only a fixed price contract was possible, and as the
Russian ruble devaluation was running around 10 percent per month , onl y
a U.S. currency contract was considered viable. In under a year the ruble
has devalued over 100 percent. For the year following the contract award
the ruble devalued a full I 000 percent.
Advance payments were also considered but discarded as precedent
setting and a form of monthly payments in 12 equal increments was
approved by the SPE and the NASA Legal Office. Concrete deliverables in
the form of studies and tests were to · be specified at the outset, but not
separately priced due to the complexity of introducing the Russians to
product based cost estimating, pricing, and payments. The subject of labor
hour pricing was considered but also wisely discarded as too complex for
this first contract.
In opening the discussion with the Russians concerning salaries and labor
hour rates the Russian's responded, "We sell space hardware not people."
This set the stage for the remaining negotiations with the Russians.
The formality of the affair was just the first of many surprises. Our
negotiation team was referred to as a de legation and treated with all the
protocol of a U.S. Government or State Department group representing the
President of the United States. We were met by the General Designer (also
General Director) of the Russian Space Program. Our "delegation" was led
by the NASA Assistant Admini strator for Russian activities and the
Associate Administrator (AA) for Space Systems Development (OSSO). This
degree of protocol was somewhat natural as both sides remembered well
the relationship and formalities of the Apollo Soyuz test project of twenty
years earlier.
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Each side made official welcoming statements. Russian/English
interpreters were indispensable as there was a complete absence of
bilingual membership on either side, notwithstanding, the fact that the
Russian side had many Soyuz engineers experienced with NASA in the
1970s on the Apollo/Soyuz test project. On the U.S. team the AA for OSSO
was the single U.S. Apollo/Soyuz member. It was clear from the warm
greetings that ensued that he was held in high regard by the Russian team.
This prior association built on friendship, trust, and ultimately success was
invaluable to NASA in the conduct of these negotiations.
The first round of negotiations called for separation of the technical and
contracting teams. The Russians saw the activities as separate and distinct,
indicating the work agreed to would have little or no relationship to the
price and other conditions in the contract.
The model contract presented by NASA required translation into Russian.
General Provisions, normally incorporated by reference, were included in
full text and then translated into Russian. Each sentence and each
paragraph was discussed at length, explained, clarified, and even then the
Russians proposed changes to all of the General Provisions and the
Standard Government Data Rights Provisions.
Each deadlock required the highest member of the U.S. delegation to
convene a meeting with the Russian General Designer. No member of the
Russian delegation had the authority to negotiate. The General Designer
singularly had the final say, but he spoke only to the head of the U.S.
delegation. His deputy dealt with the AA and the Russian Program
Manager with the U.S. program manager. Each level exchanged with their
equivalent/counterpart at every lower level.
During negotiations no agreement was made on any subject. Positions
were exchanged and then we moved onto the next issue. At the end of the
negotiations a contract was developed reflecting NASA's position with no
confidence that agreement could be reached in total or on any given issue
with the Russians.
The eleventh hour of the last day, negotiations were stopped; champagne
and brandy were served to all to celebrate the Deputy General Designer's
birthday and speeches were made round the table concerning our mutual
cooperation and success.
Negotiations resumed in earnest after the celebration; the objections were
re-stated; the potential for closure seemed impossible. At this point, when
all seemed lost, all members of both delegations were called to the General
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Designer's office. Each lead negotiator described their sticking poinls lo the
group. All but the top managemenl of both teams were then excused.
After several minutes of discussion, the General Designer called for his
negotiating team. When the team returned to the negotiating table, they
withdrew all exceptions, the contracts were prepared for signalure and a
signing ceremony was planned. The NASA Administrator had just recently
communicated his desire to sign the first NASA/Russian contracl, together
with the head of the Russian Space Agency, Mr. Koptev. This signing
ceremony was to take place in Washington, DC. This presented a small
protocol problem in that the General Designer, Mr. Seminov, also wanted to
sign the contract.
A compromise was struck after the General Designer was informed that in
the U.S. only a warranted contracting officer could sign the contract:
however, in NPO Energia it was he who could decide who would sign for
NPO Energia. The General Designer elected to sign the contract himself!
The signing ceremony was moved to a social gathering, apparently
permitting an exchange between the General Designer and a lower level
delegation member, the Contracting Officer. Hands were shaken, embraces
and kisses exchanged, and the contract signed amidst a fanfare of
photographs noting the ~ aspect of the moment. This final signing
in Washington D.C. between the two agency heads constituted a top level
ratification of the signed contract.
The short suspense of this contract action, made it impossible to reprogram
funds above $1M; thereby, limiting NASA to a negotiation position under
$1M or $999,999.00. The Russians hardly understood the subtlety
involved in the $1.00 reduction. NASA, in the interest of living up to its
initial overtures of $IM, offered a single $1.00 bill to the General Designer,
in addition to the contract amount, thereby meeting expectations for a
million dollar agreement. The first NASA $1.00 is currently on display in
the space museum at NPO Energia in Kalingrad, Russia.
This first Russian procurement became the pathfinder and set the standard
for the Agency for future negotations with the Russians. It was distribuled
to the NASA Centers, IPL, and several NASA contractors planning
subcontract activities with the Russians.
Experiences in doing business with the Russians
year were shared throughout NASA and among
form of lessons learned. Some of the following
peculiar to the Russians and reflect their recent
economy after generations of Communist Rule:
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acquired over the next
contractor personne! in the
lessons learned remain
transition to a free market

I)
Communication links between locations in the U.S. and Russian
locations in the Moscow area were nonexistent or of such poor quality as to
perturb normal program interaction, management and oversight.
A special telephone and electronic mail link was established with U.S.
Government Furnished Equipment (GFE) to the contract to resolve this
problem. Plans for expanded communications links were developed
throughout the first year of the contract.
2)
Overcoming basic mistrust concerning transfer of information which
the Russians feared could be used to reverse engineer and thereby acquire
unique Russian technology was a major problem.
Training in U.S. contracting and pricing alleviated some of the
Russian's concern when it was recQgnized that U.S. law would be violated if
NASA or American contractors attempted to steal Russian technology
delivered under a U.S. government contract. But, ultimately, personal trust
between individuals was more important in overcoming this basic
problem. The Apollo/Soyuz experience was very valuable in that they
determined that U.S. type documentation simply didn't exist in the Russian
system. So the Russians' continued reluctance to release some information
related to the fact that it simply didn't exist. Where necessary, the U.S.
technical staff created the desired documentation with the help of their
Russian counterparts.
3)
Training in U.S. cost and pricing techniques, however, did not
facilitate future negotiations. The Russian financial experts totally ignored
the rapid devaluation of the ruble but seized on the concept of establishing
labor estimates by task for future work in developing their cost estimates .
The Russian concept was to negotiate labor hours required and then
apply world market rates as a means of developing a fair value for Russian
work. Cost base contracting will remain impossible in Russia as long as
there are no accounting systems to collect and allocate costs to the
products and the ruble continues to fluctuate so radically. Other means for
developing cost estimates needed to be developed. Several approaches
were considered: cost estimating relationships, labor hours for the same or
similar work in the U.S., the use of Russian wages adjusted for inflation,
and their comparison to other U.S. industry activity in Russia. All of these
were somewhat successful and they tended to converge on approximately
the same cost range for a given set of tasks.
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4)
Translation of reports and existing documentation remains a major
effort under a Russian contract. The resources applied to this problem are
in direc t competition with resources required for the technical assess ment
products of the contract which are of principal interest.
Translation software tools were evaluated at length . The best
products on the market were supplied to NPO Energia. Human translators
found them to be insufficient for the task at hand. Most were designed for
business or legal purposes and not for space translation technology
purposes. Recognizing a serious need, several firms in Russia began the
development of space technology software called "Stylus for Space."
Together with a Small Disadvantage Business (8A) firm in the U.S., they are
marketing this software around the world. NASA's and the Russian firm' s
evaluation of the software indicates it is the best Russian to American.
American to Russian translation system on the market. The rumor is the
software was developed originally by the Soviet KGB . ( It makes you
wonder what the CIA might have that would furth er facilitate U.S./Russian
joint activities).
5)
Availability of hard currency. which is defined as anything but the
ruble, became a significant issue.
The first program review in the U.S. was almost canceled due to a
lack of hard currency. Airlines in Russia were no lon ger acceptin g rubles
as payment for plane tickets.· Payments under our first Russian contract
didn't flow smoothly, initially. This was because invoices were not
prepared properly or submitted in a timel y manner, and later because the
banks involved in transferring money to Russia were inexperienced. In
addition, the Russian banks denied receipt of the funds, without evidence
from the forwarding bank, which included serial numbers, dates, times,
amounts, etc.
Special advance travel payments were required to overcome thi s
problem. Tickets were prepaid by NASA; per diem was transferred to a
U.S. bank; even temporary loans were made by the NASA Credi t Uni on to
support the Russians while they attended their first program rev ie w in 1he

U.S.
During the year NASA al so learned that the Russian bank also taxed
the payments to NPO Energia, limiting the hard currency transferred to the
company to 20 percent of the total payment. The total payment was
adjusted in the following manner.
a)
40 percent was converted at an unfa vorable ruble rate,
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b)
c)

40 percent was converted at a favorable ruble rate (at least
favorable for that day) and,
20 percent was paid in hard currency to the Russian firm.

Recognizing the Russian firm's need for the hard currency as a
critical element of all future negotiations included reimbursement for
travel, shipments, and work in the U.S. This was critical to the success of
the first Russian contract and will continue to be critical to all future
contracts as long as the ruble fluctuation and Russian inflation is out of
control.
6)
Rights to Data remains a problem in the first Russian contract. The
contract provides that all data first produced under the contract shall be
provided to the U.S. government with unlimited rights. This is standard
under U.S. Contracts.
Unfortunately, to date, everything that has been delivered under the
contract, except for a study plan, has been marked "Proprietary" indicating
the Russians' continuing concern that their space technology will be stolen
from them unless carefully protected.
There were also lessons learned by the Russians after a year of negotiating
and working with NASA and NASA's contractors. These lesson.s were
freely discussed with me and represent a highly enlightened Russian
negotiator:
I)
Even in the first negotiations, NPO Energia understood the nature of
fixed price contracting. Perhaps their only experience is this simple form
of contract which defines what NPO Energia would do for a given price.
Examples included: Soyuz trips to MIR space station by Japan, France and
Germany. There were agreements/contracts under the Communist system
also. It's clear that the vendors involved with NPO Energia made
commitments and delivered high quality products on schedule. The
resources, however, that were applied by the vendor were normally
unknown by NPO Energia and probably came directly from the Soviet
government not through NPO Energia.
2)
During the first round of negotiations the Russians challenged the use
of U.S. law. Why shouldn't we use Russian law, or even the law of a third
impartial nation?
NASA pointed out that all the contract provisions had precedence in
U.S. law not in Russian law. Therefore, any future disagreements would
require consistent interpretations to resolve. NPO Energia then sugg~_ted

7-18

we apply independent arbitration under Geneva, Switzerland laws. In
these first contract negotiations, NPO Energia conceded to U.S. law.
However, in later negotiations with NASA contractors. NPO Energia has
insisted on arbitration under Geneva, Switzerland Jaw.
3)
At each negotiation throughout the year, the Russians refused to
accept the Examination of Records by Comptroller General clause.
Because Congressional approval is required to deviate from thi s
provision, NASA has argued successfully to retain the clause and to date
the clause has been included in NASA prime contracts and subcontracts
with Russia. As the Russian Government controls VISAs into the country.
the comptroller general could only examine records at the invitation or the
Russian Government.
4)
Achieving a fair and reasonable price for work in Russia remains a
major challenge. NASA started by scoping the value or the work ,
considering a myriad of factors. This was essential as the Russian's
estimate of the value of contract work exceeded NASA' s on the order or a
factor of ten. To encourage the Russians to develop proposals based o n
unrealistic estimates would have been counterproducti ve to both parties.
But in short order, the Russian's lesson learned was to negotiate other
elements of the agreement:
Advance Payments or milestone payments (front loaded) for
supplies, services, data and transportation remain critical to the Russian s.
The Russians have no methodology for scoping the work. no estimating
capabilities, and no historical data, so achie"'ing agreement required
application of flexible alternatives to trading price offers. Ad1.rance
payments or milestone payments are one o.f 1he- ke y alternatives. Another
alternative is descoping or revising the y,'OJ'k req uired to reac h agree ment.
Yet, another alternative is assuring work in 1he U.S . and reimburseme nt of
travel for the Russian program office personnel. (The oppo nunity to visit
the U.S. may be a fringe benefit for the Russian employees.)
In later negotiations the Russians sought salary payments while in
the U.S. These U.S. salaries were imperative for the Russians to obtain
hard currency while in the U.S. The firm paid hotel bills and covered food.
but the Russian employees were virtually penniless during their time in
the U.S. The Russians successfully negotiated salaries of $7.00 to $10.00 an
hour with a bonus of an additional $4.00 to $6.00 for English proficiency.
The lesson learned by the Russians is that there are elements other than
price that can be negotiated and that have fi nancial benefit to the company
and to the employee.

For the early discussions of a joint space station this issue of pricing
Russian effort loomed as a show stopper. The Russians sought to use U.S.
techniques for cost estimating to determine the value of their supplies and
services. NASA continued with the initial approach of scoping the work for
the Russians and providing them with the U.S. Government estimate of
value in Russia to help focus their efforts and expectations. In the joint
space station discussions we again fell into the trap of separating the
technical and business negotiating groups. The results were predictable.
The technical team developed, independent of cost, an extremely robust
Russian contribution to the joint station. The Russian financial groups are
assuming that the more the Russians contribute, the higher the U.S.
contribution to Russia would be. So a lesson NPO Energia should have
learned, perhaps the most important lesson of all, has not yet been
learned. The U.S. contribution is a very political issue because it diverts
U.S. assets away from U.S. companies offshore to Russia. This diversion of
U.S. assets to the Russians is furth er exacerbated by the downsizing of the
U.S. budget. The future of the joint space station may succeed or fail on
this single issue.
In conclusion, many of the lessons learned need to be unlearned. Use of a
contract to engage a non-market business makes no since at all. Nothing
about the agreement between these parties fits a market economy's idea of
a contract and certainly not a U.S. Government contract. In hindsight, use
of the agreements authority vested in the organization under the .Space Act
or under the Grants and Cooperative agreements authority would have
been more appropriate. Only recently has an interpretation of the latter of
these agreements authority been expanded to permit payment of
appropriated funds.
Had this interpretation existed at the time the first contract was signed in
Russia, there would have been no "First Russian Contract." The agreements
authority provides the flexibility necessary to reflect the unique
relationship necessary to conduct business under the circumstances
existing in Russia today and for sometime in the future.
Too much time and energy was wasted on U.S. regulations and statutes
designed for U.S. industry based on historical precedence which had no
relevance in Russia. The value for money invested in this first contract
was ten fold but the effort wasted on U.S. contracting rules and regulations,
if avoided might have resulted in 100 fold return which would have
clearly been a "Win Win" situation for both parties.

7·20

